Abstract: In this paper, we examine the application of a timing attack to the RC5 symmetric block cipher. The analysis is motivated by the possibility that a naive implementation of RC5 could result in the data-dependent rotations taking a time that is a function of the data. Such implementations are possible, for example, in a digital hardware or 8-bit microcontroller environment. Based on the assumption that accurate timing measurements are available for individual encryptions, the methodology of deriving key bits using timing information from a set of ciphertexts is outlined and it is shown that, for the nominal version of RC5, with only about 2000 ciphertexts and their associated timings, the cryptanalysis can be applied to determine 5 bits of the last half-round subkey with high probability. Further, using a set of about 64000 random ciphertexts, the attack can be applied to determine the entire subkey of the last half-round with high probability and, if 10 6 random ciphertexts and their timings are available, the attack has a signi cant likelihood of breaking the cipher by determining all subkeys of the cipher.
I. Introduction
The RC5 encryption algorithm 1] was introduced by Rivest as a symmetric block cipher designed to be e ciently implemented in software by making use of three basic operations: exclusive-OR, addition, and data-dependent rotations. An RC5 cipher is designated as RC5-w=r=b where w represents the word size of the target processor in bits, r is the number of rounds of the cipher, and b is the number of bytes of key. The block size of the cipher is xed at 2w bits. We shall focus the discussion in this paper on the nominal version of the cipher, RC5-32/12/16, which has a 64-bit block size, an 80-bit key, and 12 rounds.
The application of the two powerful attacks of di erential and linear cryptanalysis to RC5 is considered by Kaliski and Yin 2] , who show that the 12-round nominal cipher appears to be secure against both attacks. In 3], Knudsen and Meier extend the analysis of the di erential attacks of RC5 and show that, by searching for appropriate plaintexts to use, the complexity of the attack can be reduced by a factor of up to 512 for a typical key of the nominal RC5. As well, it is shown that keys exist which make RC5 even weaker against di erential cryptanalysis. Recently, in 4], new di erential cryptanalysis results imply that 16 rounds are required for the cipher with w = 32 to be secure. The results on linear cryptanalysis are re ned by Selcuk in 5] and, in 6], it is shown that a small fraction of keys results in signi cant susceptibility to linear cryptanalysis. Despite these results, from a practical perspective RC5 seems to be secure against both di erential and linear cryptanalysis.
In 7], Kocher introduces the general notion of a timing attack. The attack attempts to reveal the key by making use of information on the time it takes to encrypt. The applicability of the attack on asymmetric systems is demonstrated by examining timing variations for modular exponentiation operations. As noted by Kocher, implementations of RC5 on processors which do not execute the rotation in constant time are at risk from timing attacks.
In this paper, we examine the application of timing attacks to RC5 by considering an implementation for which the time it takes to encrypt (or decrypt) is non-constant and is a function of the data in each round. Although software implementations of RC5 would typically use processors for which the data-dependent rotation is performed in constant time, a naive digital hardware or 8-bit microcontroller implementation of RC5 could result in rotations with timing dependent on the size of the rotation. In such circumstances, timing attacks are applicable to RC5 and, as we shall demonstrate, have the potential to seriously compromise the security of the cipher.
II. Description of the Cipher
In our description of the cipher, all words are represented with the most signi cant bit at the left: the (i + 1)-th least signi cant bit of a word X is represented by X i] and the block of bits from the (i + 1)-th down to the (j + 1)-th least signi cant bit, i j, is represented by X i : : : j].
The RC5 algorithm consists of r rounds involving the application of 2r + 2 subkeys. Alternatively, the cipher can be viewed as the mixing of 2 subkeys with the plaintext, followed by 2r half-rounds. Let L 0 and R 0 represent the left and right half of the plaintext input, respectively, each half consisting of w bits. We use the notation L k and R k to represent the left and right half, respectively, of the cipher data at the input to the k-th half-round. Also, S k+1 represents the (k + 1)-th subkey consisting of w bits associated with the k-th half-round and generated by the key scheduling algorithm as detailed in 1]. Letting L 2r+1 and R 2r+1 represent the left and right half of the ciphertext, respectively, the RC5 encryption algorithm is given by:
where \+" represents addition modulo-2 w , \ " represents bit-wise exclusive-OR, and \X Y " is the rotation of X to the left by the log 2 w least signi cant bits of Y . For example, if w = 32, X is rotated to the left the number of positions indicated by the value of Y 4:::0].
To decrypt, the operations of the algorithm must be appropriately reversed to generate the data for each half-round by essentially going backwards through the encryption algorithm. For example, data is rotated right and the subkeys are applied by subtracting modulo-2 w from the data.
III. Basic Principles of the Attack
The timing attack of RC5 is applicable to implementations where the data-dependent rotation is executed in non-constant time and where it is possible to measure accurately Comments on the applicability of the attack to an 8-bit microcontroller are given in Section VII. In the remainder of the paper, we shall base our discussion on the implementation of the cipher in digital hardware.
Consider the block diagram of one potential hardware implementation of the nominal version of the algorithm as shown in Figure 1 . The diagram represents a straightforward synchronous, sequential logic implementation of an RC5 half-round where in the k-th halfround the shift register contains the value of L k R k , the storage register contains the value of R k , and the counter contains R k 4 : : : 0]. The rotation operation of the half-round is executed by shifting the data in the shift register by one bit in each clock cycle until the appropriate number of shifts is accomplished. The number of shifts is determined by decrementing the counter once each clock cycle until the counter is decremented to zero. When the counter is decremented to zero, the registers and counter are loaded with new values corresponding to half-round k + 1. The design represented in the diagram is not e cient -the rotations could be implemented using a barrel shifter to shift any number of bits in one clock cycle -but it does convey a simple, straightforward mapping of the algorithm into hardware. However, as we shall see, the time-varying nature of the rotations is clearly unsound from the perspective of cipher security and should be avoided.
For the implementation of Figure 1 , the total time to encrypt is directly proportional to the total number of clock cycles required to setup data for the rst half-round, retrieve data from the last half-round, and execute 24 half-rounds. Hence, the number of clock cycles is of a format
where a is a constant and N rot is the total number of single-bit rotations (i.e., shifts of the shift register) required for the encryption. (Note that we have excluded the time required to generate subkeys, assuming that these are generated once and then saved for use with each encryption.) For the 12-round nominal cipher, N rot is given by
where k represents the size of the rotation in bits required in half-round k and may be viewed as a random variable determined by the data at half-round k. For the nominal version of RC5, 0 k 31 and, if it is assumed that all values are equally likely, the expected value of k is = 15:5 and the variance of k is given by 2 = 85:25.
Consider now how information about timing can be used to extract key bits from the cipher. For simplicity, assume that each k is deterministic with a value of . Assume that the cryptanalyst acquires a ciphertext (and the associated timing of the encryption) which has the 5 least signi cant bits of the left half to be all zero, i.e., L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0. We can expect that the cryptanalyst knows the structure of the implementation and the period of the clock. Hence, the ciphertext timing information can be used to determine N cycle and the e ects of the constant a may be factored out. Of course, it is an arti cial argument to consider the size of the rotation in each halfround of the cipher to be deterministic when it is actually a random variable and the actual sum of the rotations of the rst 22 half-rounds is unknown to the cryptanalyst. In the next section, we consider a probabilistic model for deriving the expected value and variance of the timing for the rst 22 half-rounds of the cipher.
IV. Encryption Timing Model
Since the total number of single-bit rotations for the rst 22 half-rounds of the cipher is random, we now consider a probabilistic model which is useful in understanding the statistical nature of the attack. We use the model to get an estimate of the number of ciphertexts required to determine, with a high probability, the 5 bits of subkey represented as Under these assumptions, the sum of the number of rotations for the rst 22 rounds of the cipher, which we shall represent as v = P 22 k=1 k , is a random variable with a mean of v = 22 = 341 and variance of 2 v = 22 2 = 1875:5. As well, based on the central limit theorem, v is approximately Gaussian distributed.
An e ective way to determine the correct value of the partial subkey S 25 4 : : : 0] is to use a number of ciphertexts to test each possible value for the 5 bits and to determine which value is most consistent with the expected statistical distribution of the timing information. One method to do this would be to use a number of ciphertexts for which L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0 to compute an estimate of the variance of v based on the value of each candidate partial subkey: it is expected that the variance estimate when the correct value for the partial subkey is selected will be smaller than the estimate when an incorrect partial subkey is assumed. 
where r represents the actual value of the rotation in the 23rd half-round (i.e., r = 23 ) andr ;x represents the guess of the rotation in the 23rd half-round (corresponding to the candidate keyK) given R 25 4 : : : 0] = x. Using ciphertexts for which L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0, the size of the rotation in the 24th half-round is 0. Therefore, v + r = N rot and N rot can be derived from the ciphertext timing information. The value ofr ;x is determined fromr ;x = (x ?K) mod 32. Hence, for a given ciphertext and candidate key, the value of e ;x can be calculated. We can also view equation (7) 
Now assume that the cryptanalyst has available n ciphertexts for which L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0 and, hence, for large n, the number of ciphertexts corresponding to a particular value x for R 25 4 : : : 0] is given by n x n=32. For each ciphertext and candidate keyK, e ;x is computed and the mean of the square of e ;x is calculated. The result is equivalent to For incorrect candidate keys, for which j j 1, r ;x 6 = 0, and it can be shown that Ef g > Ef 0 g. The cryptanalyst can therefore collect ciphertexts and timing information (implying rotation information) and determine the key K by picking the candidate keyK which minimizes .
We now determine the probability that an incorrect key is selected over the correct key.
For this to happen, we must have < 0 or, alternatively, ? 0 < 0. Hence, the cryptanalyst must acquire enough ciphertext timings to ensure that ? 0 > 0 for all 6 = 0. From (9), it can be seen that 
It can be shown that 31 X x=0 ( r ;x ) 2 = j j(32 ? j j) 2 + (32 ? j j)j j 2 = 32j j(32 ? j j)
and, consequently, it can be easily veri ed that max P ( ? 0 < 0) = P ( ! ? 0 < 0)
where ! = ?1 or +1. 
where P (9Kj 6 = 0; < 0 ) < 31 P ( 1 ? 0 < 0) = 0:0651:
8 Therefore, the probability of picking the correct 5 bits of subkey is greater than 93.5% with 2000 ciphertexts under the assumption that the rotations in all rounds are independent. Note that the ciphertexts must be chosen such that L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0, which is true on average for 1 in 32 random ciphertexts. Hence, the correct 5 bits of subkey can be derived with high probability using about 64000 random ciphertexts and their timings.
As we shall see in Section VI, in fact, there are some dependencies in the rotations of di erent rounds which result in the probabilities of successfully deriving the key in practice being somewhat lower than expected from the model. Nevertheless, experimental evidence con rms that the approach works well when applied to the actual cipher.
V. Determining All Subkey Bits
In the previous sections, we illustrated how it is possible to determine 5 bits of the last half-round subkey S 25 with high probability using a set of random ciphertexts and their timing information. Fortunately, it is straightforward to apply the techniques on the same ciphertexts to determine the remaining bits of subkey S 25 and, with enough ciphertexts, it is possible to derive all the bits of the subkeys S k ; 3 k 24, as well.
Consider rst the derivation of all subkey bits of the nal half-round. To determine the subkey bits S 25 9 : : : 5], the cryptanalyst must use ciphertexts for which L 25 4 : : : 0] = 5 so that the key bits of interest are involved in determining the rotation of half-round 23. In this case, the total number of rotations is given by Once S 25 is derived, the remaining subkeys associated with each half-round k; 2 k 23, may be determined using the same set of ciphertexts. Once the subkey for a round k is determined, the ciphertext may be partially decrypted for one round so that the output of round k ? 1 is known. Correspondingly, the timing of the partial encryption of the rst k ? 1 rounds may be determined by subtracting the time to execute the k-th round from the time to encrypt the rst k rounds of the cipher. The new ciphertext and timing information may then be used to extract the subkey for round k ? 1 in exactly the same manner as for the subkey for round k.
The remaining subkeys, S 0 , S 1 , and S 2 , are applied to the cipher by addition to the plaintext left half, plaintext right half, and the output of the rotation operation in the rst half-round. All three of these subkeys cannot be determined using timing information but are trivially determined using only a modest number of known plaintexts and ciphertexts: R 0 , S 2 can be determined with a modest number of known plaintexts using, for example, linear cryptanalysis 2], and S 0 can be easily derived once S 1 and S 2 are determined using
VI. Experimental Results
In this section we present the experimental results which validate the e ectiveness of the attack. The model of the previous sections assumes that the values of the rotations in di erent rounds are independent. This assumption, however, is not strictly correct. These discrepancies from the model add inaccuracies to the process of statistically deriving the subkeys. However, experimental results demonstrate that the cryptanalytic technique is still very e ective and the model provides a rough approximation of the e ectiveness of the attack to determine 5 key bits of the last half-round subkey. For 2000 ciphertexts with L 25 4 : : : 0] = 0 (equivalent to about 64000 random ciphertexts), experiments on the nominal RC5 for 1000 random keys resulted in an 86.2% chance of the partial subkey S 25 4 : : : 0] being correctly determined. Using 64000 random ciphertexts, the complete subkey S 25 was correctly determined for 69.7% of the keys.
The e ectiveness of the timing attack as determined in experiments is further illustrated in Table 1 . It is clear from the table that few random ciphertexts are required to determine the bits of the last half-round subkey with a high probability. The correct derivation of all subkeys S 3 : : : S 25 does not occur with nearly as high a probability: even modest deviations in probability from 1 when determining subkeys signi cantly reduces the probability that all 23 subkeys will be successfully determined. However, it is apparent that the attack can be very e ective in determining subkeys for a large fraction of keys and should be seriously considered to ensure that an implementation of the cipher is not vulnerable.
VII. Applicability of the Attack to 8-bit Microcontrollers
To this point, we have focussed the discussion of the attack on a digital hardware implementation of RC5. However, for other environments where the rotations are not performed in constant time, the attack is also applicable. One such environment is an assembly language implementation on an 8-bit microcontroller such as the Motorola M68HC05, a popular processor used on smartcards.
For the M68HC05, any shifting of a byte must be performed by shifting one bit at a time. Hence, all operations of RC5 could easily be implemented to be constant in time, except for the data-dependent rotation. A straightforward implementation of the 32-bit rotation using 8-bit words would shift bytes one bit at a time using the carry bit to move the most signi cant bit from one byte to the least signi cant bit of the next byte. In such an implementation, it can be assumed that the k-th half-round operation will take a time (in terms of number of clock cycles) that can be represented as:
where c and d are constants and k is the integer value of R k 4 : : : 0]. Therefore, the total number of clock cycles required to encrypt is given by an expression
where a and b are constants and N rot represents the total number of byte rotations (by one bit) for all half-rounds and is dependent on the 5 least signi cant bits of the right half of the data in each half-round. Note the similarity to (2) . The values of a and b can be determined if detailed information of the implementation is known. As a result, the only variable is the number of rotations which can be determined by an accurate measurement of N cycle . Hence, using techniques similar to those outlined in the previous sections, the 5 least signi cant bits of the last half-round subkey can be determined. Subsequently, similarly to Section V, the last half-round subkey can be fully determined.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated the potential e ectiveness of timing attacks on RC5 implementations where the time to encrypt is proportional to the sum of the rotational values in each half-round. Such a situation could easily result from a naive, straightforward implementation of the cipher in digital hardware or an implementation on an 8-bit microcontroller which executes byte-wise rotations one bit at a time.
Admittedly, the cryptanalysis presented in this paper assumes accurate timing measurements of individual encryptions -an assumption which would likely be di cult to achieve in practice. However, the analysis clearly demonstrates the susceptibility of some implementations to cryptanalysis if such measurements could be made and suggests that it is vital for designers to be aware of the cryptographic issues when implementing RC5. Fortunately, the attack can be thwarted by ensuring that the rotations operate in constant time. For example, in the case of the digital hardware implementation, a barrel shifter could be used to perform any size rotation in one clock cycle.
